Research

My research focuses on Investor Attention and Corporate Governance.

Working Papers:

Silent Activism
A portion of hedge funds’ engagement can be observed through their votes and regulatory filings. However, much of their communication occurs through direct interaction with management, which is not formally recorded. I use SEC EDGAR log file data to proxy for such engagements. This proxy indeed captures hedge fund interest: one hedge fund click more than doubles the probability of an activism event. Moreover, consistent with hedge fund clicks proxying for behind-the-scenes engagement, these clicks predict corporate governance changes, for example CEO and director turnover, even in the absence of a formal activist filing. I estimate that private activism constitutes at least 26% of all hedge fund activism, and potentially as much as 56%. Private activism is particularly likely when boards have more bargaining power, as proxied by a classified board or dual class share structure, and when directors have reputational concerns, as proxied by these individuals having more outside board seats.

Presented at:
Southern Finance Association (2023), AFA Annual Meeting PhD Poster Session (2023), Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting Chicago (2022), Eastern Finance Association Annual Meeting D.C. (2022)‡, Financial Management Association European Conference Lyon (2022), Financial Management Association Annual Meeting Atlanta (2022; main program and Doctoral Student Consortium), University of Denver (2022), Bradley University (2022), Miami University Ohio (2022), Washington and Lee University (2022), University of St. Gallen (2022), UNSW (Online, 2022), University of Texas Arlington (2022), McMaster University (2022)

‡Runner-up for outstanding doctoral student paper 

The Rise of Anti-Activist Poison Pills (with Ofer Eldar and Michael Wittry)
We create a novel dataset of the terms of poison pill plans to examine their prevalence over time. Consistent with the hypothesis that poison pills have responded to the increase in hedge fund activism, recent adoptions have characteristics and provisions that appear to target hedge funds, such as low trigger thresholds. Moreover, using unique data on activist hedge fund views of SEC filings as a proxy for the mere threat of an activist intervention, we show that hedge fund interest strongly predicts pill adoption. Finally, the likelihood of a 13D filing declines after firms adopt “anti-activist” pills. Our analysis has implications for understanding the modern dynamics of market discipline of managers in public corporations, and evaluating policies that regulate defensive tactics. 

Presented at:
Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting (2024, Scheduled), Boca-RCGI Corporate Finance and Governance Conference (2023) ,Multinational Finance Society (2023), WFA (2023)*, University of Iowa (2023)*, ECGI Global Corporate Governance Colloquium (2023)*, American Law and Economics Association (2023)†, SFS Cavalcade North America at UT Austin (2023)*, University of Cambridge Judge (2023)*, Columbia Law School (2023)*, Vanderbilt Law School (2023)*, University of Texas Law School (2023)*, Duke University Fuqua (2023)*, Australasian Finance and Banking Conference (2022), Conference on Empirical Legal Studies at University of Virginia* (2022), University of California Berkeley School of Law* (2022), Tel Aviv Buchmann Faculty of Law* (2022), Drexel Corporate Governance Conference Early Ideas Session (2022)*

†Best Paper Award, Corporate Law and Governance
*Presentation by coauthor

Work in progress:

Learning from the Little Guy (with Melissa Crumling) - Presented at FMA New Ideas Session 2023*

Manager Taxation and Investment Horizon (with Amanda Marino, Pablo Machado, and Carolyn Previti) - Presented at the 2023 American Tax Association Midyear Meeting*